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1. THE MEANING OF TARIFF FREIGHT RATES 
Tariff freight rates mean the freight charges indicated in 
classified forms according to the kinds of transport service 
and the kinds of objects for transport (goods to be transported), 
at which the transFortation is to be carried out generally, 
irrespective of the person who requires the service. The 
freight which, in individual cases, is arranged for through 
negotiations or bargainings between common carriers and 
their customers may be defined as freight rates in free 
competition, and not tariff freight rates. 
The mere fact that the prices of transport service are 
indicated classificatorily in tabular form does not necessarily 
indicate that they are tariff freight rates. In the case of 
railway transportation, all freight rates are shown in a tabular 
form, and all transport transactions are always made in 
accordance with these rates, so that in this case the tariff 
denotes a clear indication of the willingness on the part of 
the common carriers to carry out the transportation of goods 
generally at the rates mentioned in the table. Such being the 
case, in so far as railways are concerned, it may be defined 
that tariff freight rates are freight rates indicated in a 
tabular form~ In the shipping business, however, there are 
freight rates, which, though given in tabular form, do not 
------------"-""---
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necessarily signify the intention of the common carriers to 
carry out the transportation of goods in accordance with 
those announced rates. Those rates which are shown in 
"freight quotations" belong to this class. The explanation 
is, therefore, incomplete if we say that tariff freight rates 
mean the rates which are published in tabular form. 
As a general rule, regular liners have their tariff rates, 
but when a company with regular steamship services operates 
tramp steamers or puts additional ships on its regular line, 
as sometimes happens, it fixes freight rates temporarily in 
a tabular form with due regard to the ruling market 
quotations, according to the kinds of goods for transport and 
their destinations, and communicate them to its customers, 
viz. shippers. In this case, the freight rates, though given 
in a definite tabular form, as in the case of tariff rates, 
simply represent the standard market freights then ruling, 
and it does not necessarily follow that the shipping com· 
pany will arrange the rates strictly according to the figures 
given in this table when goods are entrusted to it for trans· 
port. The common practice, in this case also, is rather to 
fix the rates in regard to individual cases by negotiation 
between the shipping company and the shippers concerned. 
This being so, the rates in this instance cannot be termed 
tariff freight rates; they are freight rates in free competition 
just the same. Tariff freight rates must essentially be 
such as are rigidly applied to any customers generally. 
" Tariffs" representing the tariff rates and "freight quota· 
tions" embodying the ruling standard market prices of 
transportation are very much alike superficially, but in 
substance there exists a difference such as has been pointed 
out. 
In discussing freight rates, Western scholars are apt to 
deal with "tariff" or " Tarifwesen," instead of "tariff freight 
rates." While dwelling upon the formation, merits and 
principles of' tariffs at considerable length, they make no 
reference to "tariff freight rates," beyond mentioning that 
the prices indicated in tariffs are called "tariff rates" or 
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"Tarifsai2e."" It is true that as tariff freight rates are given 
in tabular form, to discuss the tariff table is to discuss the 
rates after all, but from the point of view of the nature of 
the subjects under discussion, it is not exactly the same 
thing. To discuss tariff freight rates is to go into the 
nature of the matter directly, while to discuss the table in 
which the rates are given is an indirect method of discussion. 
Some writers think it one of the characteristics of tariff 
rates that they are settled through some measure of official 
influence. Needless to say, the governments of all countries 
are fully cognisant,of the very far-reaching effects of railway 
freights on national economy generally, irrespective of the 
kinds of railways, whether they are nationalised, public or 
private; and exercise, as part of the State powers, what is 
called " Tarifhoheit," thereby ensuring their participation in 
the fixing of tariff freight rates. Their participation takes 
the form either of official sanction of the rates decided or 
the obligation imposed on the management of railway com-
panies to give the previous information of the proposed rates." 
Such being the case, it may be admitted that in railway 
tariffs, the official influence on their establishment forms 
one of their characteristics. In marine transportation, how-
ever, tariff freight rates exist, generally speaking, only in 
regard to the transportation of goods by liner companies 
which generally combine in a Shipping Conference. Inas-
much as these rates are fixed by the Shipping Conference, 
which is a body of an international nature, no country can 
fully exercise its " TariJholzeit" over the matter."' Thus, it 
1) For instance, Emil Rank, Das Eisenbahntarifwesen in seiner Bezieh-
ung zu Volkswirtschaft und Verwaltung, S. 123; Franz Ulrich, Das Eisen-
bahntarifwesen im allgemeinen, S. 27; Kurt Giese, Das Seefrachttarifwesen, 
S. 108 If. 
2) For instance, Article 21 of the Local Railway Law of Japan, Articles 
34-39 of the regulations for the enforcement of the above-mentioned law, 
Article II of the Tramway Law (leidoho) and Articles 19-23 of the regula-
tions for the enforcement of the said law. 
3) See Sections 4 and 6 of Chapter 8 of my book entitled" The Shipping 
Conference" [i@:mtlPJ m~]o 
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may generally be accepted that they are fixed with no 
official participation or interference from the State. Such be-
ing the case, although official influence on the fixing of the 
rates constitutes one of the attributes of the railway tariff 
freight rates, it is not generally so in regard to marine 
transportation. The only exception is the case of the sub· 
sidised lines, the rates for which are amenable to State 
control, for in this case the above·mentioned characteristic 
is noticeable to a more or less extent.1J 
Some scholars hold that "public announcement" con-
stitutes one of the attributes of tariff freight rates. For in· 
stance, Grunzel, in his definition of the railway tariff employs 
the language" Die iiffentlich kundgemachte ZusammensteUung 
jener Gebiihren, ......... "" By public notification is meant the 
announcement of the rates in print which are given for 
general public, or the putting up of notices with the rates 
at places exposed to public observation. In the case of rail· 
way tariff rates, they are, almost without exception, publicly 
announced by these means," but such methods of publication 
are not always, with only very little exception, adopted in 
regard to ocean shipping tariff freight rates in all countries. 
In Japan as well as in England, most of the shipping campa· 
nies operating regular services communicate tariff rates to 
their shippers on application, but they do not usually make 
them public voluntarily. 
The most common idea held by people with regard to 
tariff freight rates is that they are fixed by the will of the 
common carriers exclusively. Some people so stress the 
unilateral nature of this decision that they add that it is 
authoritative. In explaining shipping tariff rates of freight, 
Dr. K. Giese employs the terms "einseitig festgesetztes 
Verzeichnis" or "einseitige autoritative Festsetzung.'''' These 
1) For instance, Article 5 of the Oceanic Lines Subsidy Law, of Japan. 
2) Grunzel, System der Verkekrspolitik. S. 111. 
3) Article 3 of the Japanese Railway Business Law orders the promulga-
tion of the railway freight rates at all stations. 
4) Kurt Giese, Das Seefrachttarifwesen, S. 11, 108. 
------ ------_ ... ------- ---.-.-.. -
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remarks do not, however, necessarily apply to shipping tariff 
rates, though they are applicable to railway tariff rates. It 
is true that, in shipping matters also, tariff freight rates can 
be, as Giese has it, fixed by the onesided and arbitrary will 
of a Shipping Conference, when it deals with disconnected 
and unorganised shippers. Even the Conference, however, 
cannot afford to disregard the wishes of shippers, when the 
latter organise an association among themselves and take 
joint and united action in order to withstand the arbitrari-
ness of the Conference. Then, it becomes necessary for 
both parties to confer on the terms of transportation on 
the shipping lines concerned. In such a case, the shippers' 
associations are duly consulted when the Conference contem-
plates either the fixing or altering of rates.') For instance, 
in the "Memorandum of Agreement between the South 
African shippers and the regular Steamship Lines trading to 
the UniOil Ports of South Africa."'l "The basic berth rates" are 
settled in the Memorandum, and it is agreed that "all altera-
tions in and additions to the tariff of rates of freight to be 
communicated to the South African Trade Association as 
hitherto."') In the "Memorandum of Agreement between 
the shippers and Steamship Lines trading to Australia ", it 
is stipulated "that no general increase in basis rates shall be 
made except after consultation with the Australasian Mer-
chants' Association and full consideration of the shippers' 
views thus ascertained."") These rates are tabulated as the 
freight rates for regular liners and all transactions are made 
in accordance with them. They are clearly tariff freight 
rates. Thus, it will be seen that shipping tariff rates are 
not necessarily fixed by the arbitrary will of shipping com-
panies. Nor are they fixed authoritatively. They are in 
1) See Page 230 and downwards, Page 234 and downwards and Page 568 
and downwards of my book entitled" The Shipping Conference." 
2) See the Final Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on the 
Deferred Rebate System. 1922, p. 52, and Supplement No.8 of my book 
" The ShiPPing Conference." ' 
3) See Supplement No. 9 of my book" The ShiPPing Conference." 
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some trading routes fixed in consultation with shippers or 
shippers association. 
I have explained the real nature of the tariff rates of 
freight. When they are compared with freight rates in free 
competition, to which brief reference has already been made, 
the following points of difference will be noted between 
them:-
(1) Freight rates in free competition are rates which 
are fixed separately in regard to individual transport service 
and consequently they usually vary, as the objects for trans-
port or their shippers differ. As for tariff rates, they re-
present rates of general application for transport service of 
a similar nature, which is repeatedly required. These rates 
are given in a tariff in the terms of prices for a unit of 
weight or size (for instance, one ton, one picul, etc.) generally 
adopted in transport business of the objects for transport 
according to the kinds of transport service and the kinds of 
objects for transport, and they are, as a general rule, applied 
to transport service of the same nature and to objects for 
transport of the same kind, irrespective of shippers. Thus, 
uniformity characterises tariff rates of freight. 
(2) Inasmuch as freight rates in free competition are 
fixed for application in one particular case, in consideration 
of the circumstances prevailing at the time when the trans-
port service is required, they usually differ as the circum-
stances under which they are fixed differ, even if the transport 
service required be of the same nature. In other words, 
different rates are required for individual cases. Not so 
with tariff freight rates however. As tariff rates are so 
fixed as to accord with the general economic conditions which 
tend to influence the transport interests on the route con-
cerned and the general conditions of the shipping business, 
they, as a general rule, remain unchanged, so long as 
there occur no changes in these general economic conditions. 
This being so, although no time· limit is set to tariff rates, 
they continue in force for a certain period. From this 
--.----. -- --- ---------_ ... -----~ --------
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point of view, tariff freight rates may be said to possess 
stability. 
(3) While freight rates in free competition exist when 
competition is going on among suppliers of transport service, 
tariff rates of freight can exist only when there is no rivalry 
among suppliers of transport service or when such competi· 
tion has ceased to exist. When there is competition among 
suppliers of transport service, no suppliers can be free from 
the restraining influences of their rivals upon their freight 
business policies, with the result that they are unable to 
formulate tariff rates for general application which can be 
enforced for a fairly long time. Not until suppliers of trans· 
port service find themselves in a position to adopt an 
independent freight policy without fear of restraint from 
their rivals can there be tariff freight rates. By an inde· 
pendent freight policy, I do not, of course, mean a freight 
policy which they can shape with no influence from the side 
of shippers. Since freight rates are nothing more or less 
than the prices for service fixed between the suppliers of 
service and shippers, there can be no suppliers who can fix 
them without regard to the mind of the shippers. Wbat I 
call an independent freight policy, therefore, simply means 
a policy which is shaped by suppliers without restraints from 
their rivals. In my opinion, monopoly may be taken as 
indicating that position in which one can adopt an inde· 
pendent price policy in the above sense. Viewed from this 
point of view, freight rates in free competition are fixed by 
the simple operation of the law of demand and supply, 
wbile tariff rates of freight are fixed by the principles of 
monopoly. 
2. THE FORMATION OF TARIFF FREIGHT 
RATES 
What conditions are, then, required to bring tariff freight 
rates into being? 
The first condition is that transport service is carried 
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on repeatedly and more or less regularly in accordance with 
a fixed plan. There can be no tariff rates where adequate 
methods of transport and transport equipment are provided 
only after orders for transport have been received-or where 
exist conditions analogous to the production of goods to 
order in industry. In such instances, transactions can only 
be effected by means of freight rates in free competition. 
Tariff freight rates are possible only where common carriers 
can draw up a plan for general application to meet general 
transport requirements, so that transport service can be 
offered with fixed methods and arrangements-or where, to 
cite a parallel instance in industry, the method of market 
production can be adopted. 
In such cases, transport is effected as an organised action 
conducted systematically, and transport service for individual 
objects for transport, goods or passengers, can be recognised, 
only conceptually, as a part of a transport organisation which 
is operated systematically. From the point of view of indi-
vidual objects for transport, it may be said that transport 
service of the same form is worked simultaneously for their 
benefit, regularly as well as continually and repeatedly, but 
this is a fact which exists only conceptually. As a concrete 
fact, all that exists is the systematic activity of one transport 
organisation, which operates in regular succession. 
That transport should be undertaken in such a manner 
is one of the pre-requisites of tariff freight rates. Freight 
rates in free competition can rule only where transport is 
effected only when there are cargo or passengers available, 
while, on the other hand, tariff freight rates come into 
existence when there arises a state of things in which goods 
are transported under a transport organisation which is 
operated systematically. Such being the case, tariff freight 
rates may be defined as the price for a particle of the 
systematic activity of one transport organisation, which is 
working· in regular recurrence. 
The second condition necessary for the formation of 
tariff rates is that goods which require transport service of 
__________ 0 __ •• 
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the same kind, are availabie both continually and in great 
numbers on one and the same route, as otherwise there can 
be no room for the existence of a transport organisation 
which operate3 systematically. From the point of view of 
the transport business, the material conditions required for 
a systematic transport organisation depend on the advanced 
art concerning the loading apparatus, the route and the motor 
power, which make up the transport organs, and the accu-
mulation of capital needed for obtaining such outfits. As 
the immaterial conditions, there must be a combination of 
the enterprising spirit required for operating the transport 
organisation as an enterprise and the busin2ss talents needed 
for carrying on the enterprise profitably. In order, however, 
to ensure the existence of such a transport organisation as 
an economic enterprise, it is necessary that on the route on 
which the transport business is conducted, goods which 
require transport service of the same kind should be avail-
able in great numbers and move at regular and frequent 
intervals. Such plentiful movements of goods cannot be 
hoped for unless social order is maintained, natural resources 
are fully developed and the wealth of all countries is in-
creased with the consequent advance of the economic line of 
all nations. Thus viewed, it may be said that not until 
there are advanced social civilisation and developed economy 
can there exist tariff freight rates. 
The third condition is that the common carriers con-
cerned should be so circumstanced that they can monopolise 
the transport business. That is to say, the common carriers 
must be in a position to adopt, either independently or in 
union with their confreres an independent freight policy 
without fear of competition from anywhere. If they are so 
placed as to be unable to fix their own freight rates without 
being influenced by the rates adopted by their competitors, 
their freight policy lacks stability. Their rates are liable to 
constant changes, as they cannot remain unaffected by the 
rates fixed by their rivals. In such circumstances, it is out 
of the question for the rates once fixed to be maintained for 
------ -.----~ 
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a long period so that the transport business can be operated 
in accordance with them. This being so, it is one of the 
pre-requisites of tariff rates that common carriers should be 
in a position to monopolise the business. This monopoly 
can exist in regard to the business as a whole in the case 
of railways, but in the case of shipping business, it can 
exist only in regard to the regular steamship service and 
especially in respect of the goods fit for transportation by 
regular liners. It may also be mentioned that in the railway 
business, monopoly is automatically established where the 
enterprise already existing meets the requirements on the 
route of transport satisfactorily, while in other cases it takes 
the form either of a cartel or of a trust. In the case of 
the shipping business, however, the form of a cartel only 
operates, the form of a trust being incapable of acquiring a 
monopoly. The cartel combined among liner companies is 
generally known as a " Shipping Conference." On this subject 
I dwelt at considerable length previously.') 
As I have already pointed out, the existence of a great 
demand for a transport service of the same kind on one and 
the same route is the basic fact on which tarift rates are 
formed, and at the same time it may be said that this fact 
constitutes a factor which makes it absolutely necessary for 
transactions in transport service to be effected by means of 
tariff rates. When there exists much and frequent demand 
for transport service of the same kind, it is not only too 
troublesome for common carriers to arrange for rates by 
separate negotiations with different customers but the pro-
cedure involves them in needless expense. In such cases, 
therefore, freight rates must needs be uniform, a circum-
stance which helps tariff rates into being. Such a state of 
things is remarkably in evidence in the railway transport 
business. The fact that the application of the same scale 
of rates to railway transport service of the same kind is 
1) See my article II Shipping Combinations as seen from the view-point 
of Freight Theory," No. I. of this Review. 
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ordered by law in most countries') has the natural effect of 
bringing tariff rates of freight into existence in regard to 
the railway transport business. 
In the shipping business, there is, generally speaking, 
no law in any country ordering such a uniform treatment 
of shippers in respect of rates. It nevertheless sometimes 
happens that the government makes such a treatment one 
of the terms of a shipping subsidy which it grants to a 
shipping company and a clause in this respect is inserted 
in the subsidy contract.') Where there exists no such subsidy 
contract, it is the most powerful stimulant to tariff freight 
rates that there should be much and frequent demand for 
transport service of the same kind. This is, however, a very 
modern phenomenon in the shipping business. 
Not only in the Middle Ages but even in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century, marine trade was of a very 
adventurous nature, and those who engaged in this trade were 
limited to a small number of merchants with a big capital. 
These merchants operated the trade with their vessels which 
were generally called Free Traders. In those days, there 
were, of course, no freight rates. Even in the case of 
merchants who had no ships of their own, as the goods dealt 
in by them in oversee trade in those days were bulky cargoes, 
the transport was made by chartered ships, so that charter-
age took the place of freight rates. It is obvious that the 
prices for transport service which differ according to cases, 
as in the case of the charterage referred to, can never take 
the form of tariff freight rates. 
It was not until industrial goods came to constitute the 
principal goods for transport, as a result of industrial revolu-
tion, and numerous merchants began to participate in trade 
that tariff freight rates became necessary in the shipping 
business. As the trade in industrial goods became prosperous, 
1) For instance, What Articles 3 and 6 of the Railway Business Law 
imply. 
2) For instance, the contract concluded between the Italian Government 
and the Societa di Navigatione Generate Italiana. 
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a regular steamship service, which was systematically opera-
ted, came into being, on the one hand, and there sprang up 
increasing and frequent demand for transport service of the 
same kind on the same route on the other. The result was 
that in marine transportation, transport service was divided 
into transport by charter-party and transport by individual 
contract. With regard to the transport of innumerable in-
dividual goods, which were entrusted for transport at fre-
quent intervals, shipping companies, like railway companies, 
found it too troublesome and expensive to arrange for 
freight rates in respect of individual cases separately, and 
came to choose tariff freight rates for the sake of the 
simplification of business transactions. Wheras in the 
transport by chartered ships, "the system of open com-
petition," as it is called in England, was adopted, "the system 
of uniform rates," or tariff freight rates, has been in force 
exclusively in the transport of individual goods since the 
business passed into the hands of the shipowners operating 
regular lines. 
3. THE MERITS OF TARIFF FREIGHT RATES 
Tariff freight rates bestow advantages of varying kinds 
on the general public as well as on common carriers and 
customers. 
As already mentioned, tariff rates exist only where there 
is a monopoly of the transport business, and they represent 
the prices to be paid for the transport of individual goods. In 
the tariff, the same rates are charged on goods of the same 
kind entrusted for transport, as I have endeavoured to make 
plain. The common carriers who operate their business under 
an independent freight policy can, therefore, fix the rates by 
taking into due consideration the capacity of the objects for 
transport to bear freight, that is to say, the prices of the 
goods. Thus, it will be seen that tariff rates of freight are 
fixed in accordance with the principle of "What the traffic 
will bear." 
________ •• 0 ______ -
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In the case of freight rates in free competition, it is 
naturally impossible for the prices of the goods entrusted for 
transport to be taken into consideration in fixing the rates. 
Suppose that a certain common carrier who has to carryon 
his business in competition charges the rates fixed in propor' 
tion to the prices of the goods entrusted for transport, and 
his competitor or competitors offer to undertake the trans-
portation of high'priced goods at rates slightly lower than 
he charges, as is the natural outcome of competition. In 
such circumstances, the common carrier who charges the 
rates according to the prices of the goods will be compelled 
to take those goods only on which low rates are charged, 
as all costly goods, on which he levies high rates with a 
view to making up for the loss suffered by the low rates 
charged on low·priced goods, will go to his rivals. Thus, 
the object for which the prices of the goods are taken into 
consideration in fixing the rates will be defeated. Worse 
still, he will find it difficult to carryon his business. The 
idea of fixing the rates with due regard for the prices of 
goods is, therefore, impracticable except where· tariff rates 
can be enforced. 
As tariff freight rates are fixed with due regard for the 
capacity of the goods to bear freight by taking their prices 
into account, and as they exist only where there is a mo· 
noply of the business, they ar , as already noted, generally 
enforced in the railway business, but in the shipping business, 
they are in force in regard to regular steamship services 
exclusively. They are impracticable with regard to tramp 
steamship services. 
In the regular steamship service, the adoption of tariff 
rates gives the shipping company the benefit of transporting, 
on a route which it monopolises, comparatively high·priced 
goods at rates correspondingly high, while transporting com-
paratively low·priced goods at correspondingly low rates, so 
as to prevent these goods from going to tramp steamers. 
Such being the case, by adoPting tariff freight rates, which 
are fixed in consideration of the capacity of the goods to 
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bear freight, shipowners operating regular liners on mono-
polised routes can transport as large quantities of goods as 
the circumstances prevailing at the time permit, thereby 
expanding the revenue from freight as much as possible. 
This puts the shipowners operating regular liners in a more 
favourable position as compared with those operating tramp 
steamers under freight rates in free competition. It would, 
however, be too hasty to conclude that because tariff rates 
are monopolistic in nature, shipowners operating regular 
liners can, therefore, indulge in profiteering. This phase of 
the question must, of course, be dealt with separately from 
tariff freight rates, and it may be said that the matter 
brgely depends on the strength of the monopolised position 
occupied by such shipowners. 
Another advantage which the owners of regular liners 
can derive from tariff rates is the abundant facilities afforded 
them to exercise supervision over their fellow members of 
the Conference, when they form such a combination, in order 
to see that they faithfully enforce the rates agreed upon. 
As has been repeatedly stated, when more than two ship-
owners of regular liners operate their shipping business on 
one and the same line, competition is inevitable among them. 
As each has a rival against which competition is directed, 
rivalry comes to assume the aspect of a battle, as is called 
rate war, which tends to redound to their common disadvant-
age. In order to preclude such competition, they form a cartel, 
called a Conference and fix the rates and other business con-
ditions by agreement. The rates of freight agreed upon in 
this way being common to all within the Conference, they 
naturally constitute tariff rates. The members of this Con-
ference carryon their business in accordance with these 
rates. If anyone of the members of the Conference trans-
acts business at rates fixed arbitrarily in negotiation with 
shippers, instead of at the rates agreed upon with his col-
leagues; he is guilty of an offence against the terms of the 
Conference. The faithful observance of the tariff rates by 
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ence exists not only in name but in fact. From this point 
of view, tariff freight rates may well be described as the 
measure by which the stability of the Conference can be 
judged. 
The greatest benefits which shippers generally derive 
from tariff rates are their stability and uniformity. As 
already mentioned, tariff rates, unlike freight rates in free 
competition, are not subject to constant changes, as they are 
comparatively proof against the changes which come over 
the relationship between demand and supply in respect of 
transport service. They remain unaltered for a certain 
period. In this sense, tariff freight rates possess stability. 
This stability enables the shippers who may be either sellers 
or buyers, to fix their prices by counting definitely on the 
amount of freight to pay. When there are constant changes 
in rates as in the case of freight rates in free competition, 
neither the sellers nor the buyers of goods can fix their 
prices on any solid basis. The freight rates which they must 
consider in fixing the prices of their goods in this case will 
be a dubious entity after all. The result is that they run 
the risk of incurring unexpected losses in consequence of 
fluctuations in freight rates. Such being the case, even if 
transactions themselves may be devoid of either venturesome 
or speculative elements, the changeableness of the rates 
imparts the nature of speculation to transactions in the case 
of freight rates in free competition. The stability of tariff 
rates, therefore, deprives transactions, made in accordance 
with them, of speculative elements, at least in so far as the 
freight is concerned, and helps the sound development of 
the trade. 
As above mentioned, the stability of tariff freight rates 
makes the trade done according to them free from speCUlative 
elements. At the same time, it enables people to calculate 
all freight charges with certitude in concluding long·term 
contracts or dealing in futures, thereby rendering such 
transactions possible. This, however, largely depends upon 
-----------_.------
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the degree of stability, and there naturally exists some 
difference between railway and shipping transactions. In the 
case of railways, as the monopoly is very firm, the stability 
of the rates is accordingly very steadfast whereas in the 
shipping industry, as tariff rates exist in regard to regular 
liners only, as I have frequently mentioned, and as, moreover, 
the monopoly, on which the stability of the rates hinges, is 
not so deep·rooted as in the case of railways, a latent 
competition always existing, the rates cannot but be less 
lasting. Nor are those traders who, in view of the nature 
of their goods, are obliged to make use of tramp steamers, 
to share in the advantages accruing from the stability of 
freight rates. Tramp steamers are utilised by those who 
handle mining, forestry and agricultural products, while 
regular liners are chiefly used by those who handle industrial 
goods. Such being the case, it may be said that industrial 
countries or advanced countries are more closely interested 
in the stability of tariff freight rates adopted for regular 
liners than agricultural countries or backward countries. 
Next, the uniformity of rates means the charging of the 
same freight on goods of the same kind requiring the trans-
port service of the same description on the same route, irres-
pective of shippers. I have already referred to the uniformity 
of this nature, which tariff freight rates possess. As this 
uniformity of rates entitles small shippers, or those who 
entrust small quantities of goods for transport, to the same 
treatment as that accorded big shippers, or those who 
contract for the transport of large quantities of goods, it 
puts them on the same footing in carrying on competition, 
at least in so far as freight rates are concerned. It is usual 
that those who handle large quantities of goods and make 
enormous transactions enjOY greater advantages and facilities 
in many respects as compared with those who handle small 
quantities of goods and make small transactions. From this 
point of view, tariff rates help and protect small shippers in 
their competition with big ones. As, moreover, small shippers 
are numerous, while big ones are limited in number, the 
... _---------------" 
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fact that tariff freight rates rule in respect of the domestic 
transport business, as, for instance, the railway service, may 
be interpreted as calculated to protect merchants and in-
dustrialists generally, and consequently to redound to the 
advantage of the consumers at large_ 
In oversea trade, tariff rates and the uniformity of rates 
inherent in them are available in regard to regular liners 
exclusively, as I have already explained, and the benefits 
accruing therefrom are chiefly enjoyed by small shippers of 
industrial goods_ Big shippers stand to gain more from 
freight rates in free competition than from tariff rates. In 
the case of freight rates in free competition, for instance, 
big shippers can adopt a strong attitude in their negotiations 
with shipowners for fixing the rates because the space re-
q uired by their goods is immense_ As for those engaged in 
the shipping business, the appearance of competitors for 
these higher class goods obliges them to be content with 
such rates as enable them to cover the cost of transport and 
as are only little higher than those charged on the lower 
class goods, for instance on agricultural products. In arrang-
ing for rates in such circumstances, they cannot afford to take 
into consideration the fact that the industrial goods are costly 
ones and are consequently capable of bearing higher rates_ 
In short, they are obliged to fix rates in disregard of the 
principle of "What the traffic will bear_" Thus, there arises 
the question, which is more conducive to the development 
of oversea trade in the industrial goods of the country, tariff 
rates of freight, which protect the interests of small shippers, 
or freight rates in free competition, from which big shippers 
derive greater benefits than from the other procedure_ 
Inasmuch as big export traders are influential merchants 
in international commercial competition, it seems to be not 
only in their interests but desirable from the point of view 
of the future development of the export trade of the country 
that they should be put in a favourable position in the 
matter of freight rates_ It is for this reason that some 
people maintain that freight rates in free competition tend 
--- --------_.----------
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to promote the development of foreign trade of a country, 
but the advantages which are exclusively given big shippers 
in the matter of rates are destined to result in international 
trade being monopolised by a limited number of big merch-
ants. This will lead to a situation in which producers of 
goods for export will be brought under the sway of these 
traders with big capitals. The reslllt will be that the pro-
duction of goods for export will be dictated by these export 
merchants who have an eye to their selfish interests, and 
the natural growth of the export industry will be impeded. 
Both from the point of view of the prosperity of domestic 
industry and from that of the future development of the 
export trade, the rise of such a state of things seems to be 
disadvantageous as compared with cases where a large 
number of small traders can engage in the export business 
in competition with a small number of big traders on an 
equal footing under the tariff rates system. It sometimes 
happens that an export industry is developed by the manu· 
facture of a new commodity, to which little attention is 
usually paid by domestic merchants, and this is possible 
when manufacturers are in a position to give full play to 
their originality and ingenuity. The existence of many small 
traders renders the export of such commodities easier also. 
In cases where the export trade is monopolised by a small 
number of big traders, who direct the manufacture of such 
goods from mercenary motives alone, the export of newly 
designed goods is liable to be either neglected or discouraged. 
Furthermore, the increase of the sum total of the export 
trade of the country can be more easily looked for when the 
export trade is competitively carried on among a large 
number of traders than when it is monopolised by a small 
number of traders. Tariff freight rates are, therefore, more 
conducive to the development of the export trade of indust-
rial goods than freight rates in free competition. 
I have dealt with the chief advantages which tariff 
freight rates bestow upon common carriers and shippers, 
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and, through them, on the general public. Some scholars 
maintain that tariff rates operate to ward off a panic by 
checking extreme speculative practices and also that they 
have the advantage of enabling entre preneurs to quote the 
old prices, even when the prices have developed a downward 
tendency. Dr. K. Giese, for instance, says to the effect that 
" in some respects, a tariff operates to regulate the prices 
(of commodities). As a rise in the prices of commodities 
affects the tariff only very slowly, the general market can 
be warned before speculative transactions develop extreme 
proportions. Especially, those engaged in the shipping busi· 
ness can take warning from an excessive increase in the 
demand for tonnage. In this way, the edge of the threatened 
panic can be blunted. When business depression sets in also, 
a very slow decline in freight rates under the tariff system 
produces similar effects. The fact that the freight rates 
under the tariff system decline but slowly when economic 
depression sets in-and when economic depression sets in it 
is often a vital question for a manufacturer to maintain the 
prices for the goods held in stock-enables the holders of 
stock·in·trade to quote high prices for a certain period on 
the ground that there has been no change in the rates.''') 
With regard to the effects of tariff rates of freight in 
the days when business depression sets in, I hold a view 
just the opposite to the one I have just quoted. The gradual 
increase of actual demand (consumers' demand) for the goods, 
which is prompted in certain circumstances, leads to a rise 
in the prices of commodities, resulting in business prosperity. 
If, in such cases, merchants or producers form an erroneous 
estimate of the actual demand (consumers' demand) in the 
market and start speculative production and speculative 
transactions. Such speculative transactions will at last result 
in unmasking a disparity between actual demand (consumers' 
demand) and supposed demand (merchants' demand), which 
is nothing but a panic. If, in these cases, freight rates can 
exert any restraining influence over this panic, such rates 
1) Kurt Giese, Das Seefrachttarifwesen, S. 101. 
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must be necessarily ones which are very susceptible to 
fluctuations in the market prices of commodities. Freight 
must rise even at a greater rate than the market prices of 
commodities so that speculative transactions and production 
may be rendered difficult, if a panic is to be nipped in the 
bud. Even if it cannot be averted, its dimensions can be 
circumscribed. If freight rates are kept at· a low level, 
notwithstanding the rising tendency of the prices of com-
modities, they will have the effect of accentuating the 
supposed demand (merchants' demand) with the inevitable 
effect of expediting an economic panic. They can never 
operate to keep off a panic. In my opinion, therefore, it is 
freight rates in free competition, not tariff rates of freight, 
that can operate to prevent a panic coming on the market. 
Dr. K. Giese is perhaps under the impression that when 
tariff freight rates remain stationary in a period of business 
prosperity, when the general prices are forced up, it will 
increase the supposed demand (merchants' demand) in com· 
parison with the time when freight rates rise in proportion 
to the general prices, and there will be an increase in the 
quantities of the goods to be transported. This abnormal 
increase of goods to be transported, he seems to think, will 
cause merchants and prod acers to be on their guard and 
refrain from speculative transactions or speculative produc-
tion, with the result that a panic will be either prevented 
or lessend. Generally speaking, however, either merchants 
or producers are apt to put a favourable construction on the 
state of the market, when there is business prosperity and 
the general prices are rising, and shape their course in a 
way calculated to accelerate a panic. They very often fail 
to notice the abnormal nature of the increase in the move-
ments of goods, and it is hardly possible that they take 
should warning from such a state of affairs. If they really 
can see the danger in the abnormal increase of the supposed 
demand (merchants' demand) in the increasing movements 
of goods, accentuated by the fact of the freight rates remain-
ing stationary, must also be able to see other facts pointing 
---,------------- -------_.-----------" 
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to the same tendency, as for instance, an increased demand 
for funds and a rise in the discount rates and in the interest 
on loans. That a panic does come in spite of the existence 
of these factors indicative of an abnormal increase in the 
supposed demand (merchants' demand,) from which they 
ought to have taken warning, shows that on the merchants 
and producers concerned these signs are lost. The view 
that a panic can be averted by tariff freight rates remaining 
stationary is no more tenable than the opinion that a panic 
can be warded off by keeping intact the interest on loans 
and discount rates. 
Nor can I agree with those who hold that fact that tariff 
freight rates remain unchanged, instead of going down as the 
prices of commodities fall, when economic depression sets in, 
forms a reason for the entre preneurs keeping their price at 
the old level, so that they can lessen the blow from the econo-
mic depression. For the decline of prices on the advent of 
a business depression is due to a diminution in the purchasing 
power of the public and a· decrease in the actual demand 
(consumers' demand), and neither cause can be removed by 
keeping freight rates intact. The efforts to be made by the 
sellers to prevent a fall in the seIling prices on the ground 
that freight rates remain stationary will be unavailing, if no 
purchasers are forthcoming at their prices. From this point 
of view, I believe that freight rates in free competition, which 
respond so easily to the rises and falls of prices, tend to 
lessen the blow from business depression to a greater extent 
than tariff freight rates, for if a fall in freight rates combines 
with a fall in the prices of goods to lower the seIling prices, 
it will stimulate the actual demand (consumers' demand), or 
at least it will have the effect of modifying its diminution. 
4. THE PRINCIPLES RULING TARIFF RATES 
As freight rates in free competition are rates which 
obtain where there is free competition, they are fixed in 
accord with the relation between demand and supply actually 
existing at the time when transport service is needed. Need-
.---------.--~ 
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less to say, they are ruled by the moneymaking principle, 
from the point of view of private economy. On the other 
hand, tariff rates being rates which obtain where there is a 
monopoly of the business, they are ruled by the principles 
of public economy, when the monopoly springs from reasons 
for advancing the public good, though they are ruled by the 
money-making principle, when the monopoly is created as a 
requisite for the execution of business on money-making 
principles. Even when the business itself is a private en-
terprise, the principles of public economy cannot be ignored 
in fixing tariff rates, though the principles of money-making 
economy may largely operate in the matter, provided the 
monopoly of the transport business is sanctioned either by 
the State or by a local autonomous body from motives of 
promoting the public good. 
For instance, the rates for tramp steamers are regulated 
by the relation between the supply and demand of space 
where there is free competition, and these are fixed on the 
side of suppliers of transport service on money-making 
principles, pure and simple. On the other hand, the rates 
for railways take the form of tariff rates, because of the 
monopolistic nature of the railway business. In the case of 
State-owned railways, these rates are fixed in pursuit of the 
economic and social policies aiming at the development of 
national economy and the progress of social life, or, in other 
words, in consonance with the principles of public economy. 
In this case, tariff rates may be taken as one illustration of 
the national economic policy. Concerning private railways 
also, although the rates are fixed in accordance with the 
business policy of the companies which own them, the State 
reserves to itself the right to participate, whenever it deems 
it necessary, in the matter of fixing them, through the 
exercise of the Tari/hoheit, which it has over the domestic 
transport business, for the railway business is admittedly 
very closely bound up with the national life and consequently 
occupies an important position in the national economic 
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report the rates they have fixed to the proper authorities 
and obtain their approval previous to public announcement. 
In such cases, therefore, the money-making principle rules 
tariff rates only in so far as it does not contravene the 
principle of promoting the public good. 
With regard to shipping freight rates, those for regular 
steamers on international routes are tariff rates due to the 
monopoly secured by a shipping ring or a Conference, which 
exists on almost all routes now-a-days. Unlike railways, how· 
ever, this monopoly is neither granted by any particular 
country for the promotion of the public good from the point 
of view of its own national economy, nor is it conceded by 
the Powers interested in these lines on consultation among 
themselves for the same purpose of advancing the public 
good. This is entirely due to the desire of the steamship 
compaines forming the Conference to carryon their busin-
ess profitably. It is a monopoly which is established and 
maintained by these companies by mutual concession to 
avoid mutual loss which is sure to result from competition, 
to the detriment of the healthy development of the business. 
It is a monopoly which arises entirely out of the restraint 
which the competitors themselves put on their rivalry-a 
self-restraint which is born of their desire to increase their 
profits. The rates in this instance, though tariff ones, are 
ruled by the principles of money-making economy, as in the 
case of freight rates in free competition, the only difference 
between them lying in the fact that while the former is 
based on monopoly, the latter is not. 
Although both railways and regular liners adopt tariff 
rates alike, their rates are ruled by different principles, for 
the monopoly on which they are based is different in nature. 
While the principle of promoting the public good, pure and 
simple, or that of money-making consistent with the promo-
tion of the public good governs the railway rates, the 
principles ruling the shipping rates are almost entirely those 
of increasing business profits. The fundamental reason for 
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creating this difference is the freedom of the seas. As land 
helongs to the sovereignty of some particular State, the 
railway business which is operated on it is amenable to the 
Tarifhoheit of the State concerned, and consequently tariff 
rates are governed by the principles of public economy, 
directly or indirectly. In the case of the high seas, however, 
they are under the sovereignty of no country, nor can any 
country exercise Tarifhoheit there, and so there only remains 
the money-making principle to be adopted by the shipowners 
concerned. This fact gives rise to the difference that while 
the tariff rates of railways are of the nature of national 
economy, those for regular liners are of international economy 
by nature_ That is to say, although the tariff rates for 
railways are influenced by the economic policy of the State 
concerned, those for regular liners are not amenable to the 
economic policy of any country. 
It is true that there are what are called international 
railways, but they are international, not in the sense that 
the rates are fixed in accord with the principle of inter-
national economy, but simply in the technical sense that they 
traverse several countries. Although they traverse several 
countries technically, the rates are fixed by each country in 
accordance with the policy it generally adopts towards the 
railways of its own state_ Thus, the tariff rates of railways 
are generally affected by the various circumstances attending 
the national economy of each country, so that they bear the 
characteristics of each country. Again, though the rates for 
regular liners partake of the nature of international economy, 
and are fixed on the lines of the money-making principle, 
the State sometimes takes a part in the fixing or altering of 
the rates for the shipping companies of its own nationality 
as one condition for the grant of a shipping subsidy for the 
promotion of its shipping or trade interests. In this case, 
the principles of public economy play their part in fixing 
the tariff rates for regular steamers on international lines, and 
the nature of national economic policy is sometimes imparted 
to such rates. But as I have already explained, the rates 
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for the regular steamers on international lines are fixed by 
compromise between at least two shipping companies of 
different nationalities which form a shipping conference. 
Sometimes, the companies of different nationalities which 
take part in the discussion on the fixing of such rates number 
a dozen. Such being the case, any country which may 
desire to carry out a definite freight policy designed for its 
own benefit through the shipping company or companies of 
its own nationality can do so only in 50 far as 5uch a policy 
accords with, or does not run counter to, the business policy 
of all these shipping companies. In other words, in such 
cases, the principle adopted by some particular country for 
advancing the public good can be enforced within the limits 
of not contravening the money·making principle of the ship· 
ping companies concerned. When; however, the shipping 
company of this particular country occupies so influential a 
position in the Conference in that route as the result of a State 
subsidy which it receives, -that it can lead the Conference, 
and that all other companies within the Conference are 
obliged to follow the freight policy dictated by this company, 
the national economic policy of the country, to which it 
belongs, may be reflected in the . rates _ for the regular 
steamers on international route. In order to win such a 
favourable position, one company within the Conference must 
necessarily occupy the predominant position over aU other 
companies, and this is by no means an easy task to accomp· 
lish, not only from the point of view of capital power but 
from that of the capacity for business management. It, 
therefore, follows that the freight rates for the regular 
steamers on international routes are, as a matter of fact, of 
the nature of international economy ruled by the money-
making principle, and are, on the whole, independent either 
of the policy of any particular State for promoting the public 
good, or of its national economic policy. 
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